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1More than 6-in-10 (63%) Americans agree that the immigration system should deal 
with immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. illegally by allowing them a way 
to become citizens, provided they meet certain requirements. Less than 1-in-5 (14%) 
say they should be permitted to become permanent legal residents but not citizens, 
while approximately 1-in-5 (21%) agree that they should be identified and deported.
More than 7-in-10 (71%) Democrats, nearly two-thirds (64%) of independents, 
and a majority (53%) of Republicans favor an earned path to citizenship. Similar 
numbers of Democrats (13%), independents (14%), and Republicans (13%) favor 
a path to legal residency but not citizenship. Meanwhile, 13% of Democrats, 21% 
of independents, and 32% of Republicans favor deportation.
Majorities of all religious groups, including Hispanic Catholics (74%), Hispanic 
Protestants (71%), black Protestants (70%), Jewish Americans (67%), Mormons 
(63%), white Catholics (62%), white mainline Protestants (61%), and white evan-
gelical Protestants (56%), agree that the immigration system should allow immi-
grants currently living in the U.S. illegally to become citizens provided they meet 
certain requirements.
Americans rank immigration reform sixth out of seven issues, far behind economic 
issues, as the highest political priority for the president and Congress. Less than 
one-quarter (24%) of Americans say that reforming the nation’s immigration system 
should be the highest priority for the president and Congress, while 47% of Ameri-
cans report that reforming the immigration system should be a high priority but not 
the highest, and nearly 3-in-10 (27%) think that immigration reform should be given 
a lower priority.
Nearly half (45%) of Americans say the Republican Party’s position on immigration 
has hurt the party in recent elections. Less than 1-in-10 (7%) Americans say that the 
Republican Party’s stance on immigration has helped them in recent elections, while 
more than 4-in-10 (42%) say it has not made a difference. 
Approximately 4-in-10 Republicans (39%) and Americans who identify with the 
Tea Party (41%) think the Republican Party’s position on immigration has hurt 
the party in recent elections. Close to half (46%) of Republicans and a similar 
number of Tea Party members (44%) say it did not make a difference.
About 4-in-10 (39%) Hispanic Americans overall say the Republican Party’s posi-
tion on immigration hurt the party in the 2012 election. Approximately 4-in-10 
(41%) say it did not make a difference, and 14% say it helped the Republican Party. 
Executive Summary
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Americans are more likely to say they trust the Democratic Party, rather than the 
Republican Party, to do a better job handling the issues of immigration (39% vs. 29%) 
and illegal immigration (43% vs. 30%). However, nearly 1-in-4 (23%) Americans say 
they do not trust either party to handle the issue of immigration.
Americans generally perceive that immigrants are having more of an impact on Amer-
ican society as a whole than on their own communities. Less than one-third (32%) of 
Americans say that immigrants today are changing their community a lot, compared 
to 46% of Americans who say immigrants today are changing American society a lot.
Views about immigrants’ impact on American society are strongly associated 
with political ideology. Conservatives (36%) and liberals (31%) are nearly equally 
as likely to say that immigrants are changing their own communities a lot. How-
ever, conservatives (53%) are significantly more likely than liberals (38%) to say 
that immigrants are changing American society a lot.
Overall, Americans are more likely to have positive rather than negative views about 
immigrants. 
A majority (54%) of Americans believe that the growing number of newcomers 
from other countries helps strengthen American society, while a significant minor-
ity (40%) say that newcomers threaten traditional American customs and values.
A strong majority (59%) of Americans believe that immigrants today see them-
selves as part of the American community, much like immigrants from previous 
eras, while 36% disagree.
Americans register some concerns about the economic impact of immigrants. While 
nearly two-thirds (64%) of Americans agree that immigrants coming to this country 
today mostly take jobs that Americans don’t want, a majority (56%) of Americans 
simultaneously say that illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving down wages 
for many Americans.
Although deportations of illegal immigrants have increased since the beginning of the 
Obama administration, less than 3-in-10 (28%) Americans correctly state that depor-
tations have increased over the past five or six years. A plurality (42%) of Americans 
believe that the number of deportations has stayed the same, while nearly 1-in-5 (18%) 
say deportations have decreased.
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There is broad agreement about a set of values that should guide immigration policy. 
Five values are rated very or extremely important as moral guides to immigration 
reform by approximately 8-in-10 Americans: promoting national security (84%), 
keeping families together (84%), protecting the dignity of every person (82%), 
ensuring fairness to taxpayers (77%), and enforcing the rule of law (77%). 
Nearly 7-in-10 (69%) also say following the Golden Rule—“providing immi-
grants the same opportunity that I would want if my family were immigrating to 
the U.S.”—is a very or extremely important value. 
Far fewer Americans say continuing America’s heritage as a nation of immigrants 
(52%) or following the biblical example of welcoming the stranger (50%) are very 
or extremely important guides for immigration reform.
The face of American society has changed dramatically over the course of a single 
generation. More than 7-in-10 (71%) seniors (age 65 and older) identify as white Chris-
tian (29% white evangelical Protestant, 23% white mainline Protestant, and 17% white 
Catholic). By contrast, less than 3-in-10 (28%) Millennials (age 18-29) identify as white 
Christian (10% white evangelical Protestant, 9% white mainline Protestant, and 6% 
white Catholic).
Demographic differences are reflected in sharply contrasting evaluations of how 
American culture and way of life has changed since the 1950s. A majority (54%) of 
Americans say that since the 1950s, American culture and way of life has mostly 
changed for the worse, while 4-in-10 (40%) say it has mostly changed for the better.
There are significant racial divisions, with 61% of white Americans reporting that 
American culture has changed for the worse, while majorities of black (56%) and 
Hispanic Americans (51%) report that things have changed for the better.
When asked directly, only about 1-in-10 white, non-Hispanic Americans say they 
agree that the idea of an America where most people are not white bothers them, but 
when asked indirectly in a controlled survey experiment, agreement rises to nearly 
one-third (31%).
More than 6-in-10 (61%) Americans favor allowing illegal immigrants brought to the 
U.S. as children to gain legal resident status if they join the military or go to college, a 
policy which comprises the basic elements of the DREAM Act. Approximately one-
third (34%) of Americans oppose this policy.
Few Americans favor a policy colloquially known as “self-deportation,” in which con-
ditions are made so difficult for illegal immigrants that they return to their home 
country on their own. Approximately one-third (34%) of Americans agree that this 
is the best way to solve the country’s illegal immigration problem, while nearly two-
thirds (64%) disagree.
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Since 2006, when the bipartisan efforts of President George W. Bush, Senator John 
McCain, and the late Senator Edward Kennedy failed to achieve comprehensive immi-
gration reform legislation, the issue of immigration has been a perennial issue of pub-
lic debate. Yet, despite Americans’ significant discontent with the current immigration 
system and their broad support for a comprehensive overhaul, immigration reform 
legislation has languished. Two developments succeeded in making the passage of 
comprehensive immigration reform less likely. First, the 2008 economic collapse dra-
matically reshuffled the governing priorities of both parties. For most Americans, the 
immigration issue ranks much lower than fixing the economy or reducing the budget 
deficit. Second, the 2010 congressional elections, which gave the GOP a strong major-
ity in the House of Representatives, brought in a large class of Tea Party members who 
are generally strongly opposed to such legislation. 
However, recent events have conspired to put immigration reform back on the legisla-
tive agenda. First, even before the 2012 presidential election, President Obama sig-
naled that immigration reform would be the centerpiece of his second-term agenda. 
Second, the 2012 election demonstrated the growing clout of Hispanic voters, par-
ticularly in western battleground states. Obama’s lopsided margin among these voters 
provided strong incentives for both parties, but especially Republicans who had been 
opposed to immigration reform, to make immigration reform a more significant pri-
ority. 
In February 2013, Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), in partnership with the 
Brookings Institution, conducted one of the largest surveys ever fielded on immigra-
tion policy, immigrants, and religious and cultural changes in the U.S. The survey of 
nearly 4,500 American adults explores the many divisions—political, religious, ethnic, 
geographical, and generational—within the nation over core values and their relation-
ship to immigration. The new survey also tracks key questions from surveys conducted 
by PRRI in 2010-2011. 
Introduction: The 2013 
Religion, Values, and 
Immigration Reform Survey
6Importance of Immigration Compared to 
Other Issues
Immigration reform may loom large on the legislative radar, but economic issues 
remain at the top of Americans’ political priorities. Majorities of Americans report 
that improving the job situation (65%) and reducing the budget deficit (56%) should 
be the highest priorities for President Obama and Congress. Immigration reform 
ranks sixth out of seven issues as the highest priority for Americans. Less than one-
quarter (24%) of Americans rank reforming the nation’s immigration system as the 
highest priority for the president and Congress, while 47% of Americans report that 
reforming the immigration system should be a high priority but not the highest, and 
nearly 3-in-10 (27%) think that immigration reform should be given a lower priority. 
There are few partisan differences on the relative importance of immigration reform 
compared to other legislative priorities; however, there are some divisions by race and 
religious affiliation.
Among racial and ethnic groups, Hispanic Americans stand out in prioritizing immi-
gration reform. Nearly half (46%) of Hispanic Americans say that reforming the nation’s 
immigration system should be the highest priority for the president and Congress, com-
pared to about 3-in-10 (31%) black non-Hispanic Americans, more than 1-in-5 (22%) 
Asian Americans, and less than 1-in-5 (18%) white non-Hispanic Americans.1
These racial and ethnic differences are also visible among religious groups. Half (50%) 
of Hispanic Catholics think that reforming the nation’s immigration system should be 
politicians’ highest priority, while more than one-third (34%) think it should be a high 
priority but not the highest. Similarly, a plurality of Hispanic Protestants (43%) agree 
that reforming the immigration system should be the highest priority, while an addi-
tional 37% report that it should be a high priority, but not the highest. 
1 Throughout this report, black non-Hispanic Americans will be referred to as “black Americans” for 
the sake of  brevity. The sample size for Asian Americans is small (N=94) and should be interpreted 
with caution throughout this report. Throughout this report, white non-Hispanic Americans will be 
referred to as “white Americans” for the sake of  brevity.
The Political Context: 
Importance of Immigration 
Reform and Perceptions of 
Political Parties
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Political Party Most Trusted to Handle the Issue of Immigration 
2010 vs. 2013
Political Party Most Trusted to 
Handle Immigration
Americans are more likely to say they trust the Democratic Party to do a better job 
than the Republican Party in handling the issue of immigration (39% vs. 29%). How-
ever, nearly 1-in-4 (23%) Americans say they do not trust either party to handle the 
issue. The public expresses similar sentiment when the issue is illegal immigration. The 
Democrats have a modest advantage over Republicans (43% vs. 30%), while roughly 
1-in-5 (19%) Americans report that they do not trust either party to handle the issue.
In 2010, Americans placed roughly equal trust in the two parties’ ability to handle the issue 
of immigration. Approximately 4-in-10 (37%) Americans reported trusting the GOP over 
the Democrats, and 37% said they trusted the Democratic Party over the Republicans.2 
Thus, the current Democratic advantage on this issue is due primarily to an eight-point 
drop in trust of the Republican Party on the issue over the past three years. 
Trust in both parties’ ability to handle the issue of immigration is highly politically 
polarized. Strong majorities of Democrats (84%) and Republicans (75%) trust their 
respective parties to do a better job handling the issue of immigration. Independents 
2 ABC News/Washington Post Poll, October 2010 (N=1,002).
Source: Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013 (N=4,465); 
ABC News/Washington Post Poll, October 2010 (N=1,002).
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are roughly divided over whether they place more trust in the Democrats (27%) or 
Republicans (23%) on the issue of immigration. Nearly 4-in-10 (38%) independents 
say they do not trust either party to handle the immigration issue. Interestingly, Amer-
icans who identify with the Tea Party (62%) are significantly less likely than Repub-
licans overall to report that they place more trust in the Republican Party’s ability to 
handle immigration. Nearly 3-in-10 (28%) say they don’t trust either party on the issue.
Liberals have more faith in the Democratic Party (65%) on the issue of immigration 
than conservatives have in the Republican Party (48%). More than 1-in-5 (21%) con-
servatives say they trust the Democratic Party more than the Republican Party on the 
issue of immigration.
Religious groups are divided over which political party they trust to do a better job 
handling the issue of immigration. Seven-in-ten (70%) black Protestants say they place 
more trust in the Democratic Party’s ability to handle immigration. A plurality of 
religiously unaffiliated Americans (46% vs. 22%) and Catholics (43% vs. 27%) also 
say they trust the Democratic Party over the Republican Party to handle immigra-
tion. Among Catholics, there is a significant ethnic divide: Hispanic Catholics are 
much more likely to trust the Democratic Party over the Republican Party (59% vs. 
14%), while white Catholics are nearly evenly divided (34% vs. 35%).3 White mainline 
Protestants are also nearly evenly divided between the parties: one-third (33%) trust 
the Democrats, 30% trust the Republicans, and 29% say they trust neither party. By 
contrast, a majority (52%) of white evangelical Protestants say they place more trust 
in the Republican Party on the issue of immigration, while 18% say they trust the 
Democratic Party.
There are similar divides by race and ethnicity.4 Two-thirds (67%) of black Americans 
say they trust the Democratic Party to do a better job handling the issue of immigra-
tion, as do a majority (54%) of Hispanic Americans. Less than 1-in-5 (19%) Hispanic 
Americans say they trust the GOP more than the Democrats on this issue. White 
Americans are more divided: 36% trust the Republican Party more on the issue of 
immigration, while 32% say they trust the Democratic Party.
Political Impact of the Republican Party’s  
Position on Immigration
Close to half (45%) of Americans say the Republican Party’s position on immigration 
has hurt the party in recent elections. Less than 1-in-10 (7%) Americans say that the 
Republican Party’s stance on immigration has helped it in recent elections, while more 
than 4-in-10 (42%) say it has not made a difference. 
3 Because this question was asked of  half  the sample, the sample size of  Hispanic Catholics for this 
question is small (N=98); results should be interpreted with caution.
4 Asian Americans could not be analyzed in this section because of  sample size limitations.
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Approximately 4-in-10 Republicans (39%) and Americans who identify with the Tea 
Party (41%) think their party’s position on immigration has hurt the party in recent 
elections. Nearly half (46%) of Republicans and 44% of Tea Party members say it has 
not made a difference, and roughly 1-in-10 Republicans (11%) and Tea Party members 
(12%) believe it has helped the party.  
Did the Republican Party’s Position on Immigration 
Help or Hurt in Recent Elections?  
By Party Affiliation
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Democrats are more likely than Republicans to believe that the GOP’s position on 
immigration has hurt the party in recent elections. Nearly 6-in-10 (57%) Democrats 
think the GOP has been hurt by its position on immigration, while more than one-third 
(34%) say that it has not made a difference, and only 1-in-20 (5%) think it has helped. 
More than 4-in-10 (44%)  independents say the Republican Party has been hurt by its 
position on immigration. A similar number of independents (45%) say the Republican 
Party’s position on the issue of immigration has not affected its electoral performance 
in recent elections, while only 5% say it has helped the party. 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013 (N=4,465).
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Religious groups differ on the extent to which the Republican Party was helped or 
hurt by its position on immigration in recent elections. More than 6-in-10 (63%) 
Jewish Americans,5 a majority (53%) of white mainline Protestants, and nearly half 
(49%) of religiously unaffiliated Americans say the GOP has been hurt by its position 
on immigration in recent elections. Black Protestants (44% vs. 42%) and white evan-
gelical Protestants (41% vs. 46%) are roughly equally as likely to say the issue of immi-
gration hurt the Republican Party as they are to say it did not make a difference. White 
Catholics (46% hurt, 45% no difference) and Hispanic Catholics (43% hurt, 38% no 
difference) are similarly divided.
There are notable divisions on this question by race and ethnicity. About 4-in-10 (39%) 
Hispanic Americans say the GOP’s position on immigration hurt it in the 2012 elec-
tion, while approximately 4-in-10 (41%) say it did not make a difference, and 14% say it 
helped the Republican Party, considerably more than white Americans (5%) and black 
Americans (7%). 
5 Jewish respondents include those who identify religiously as Jewish, as well as those who say they are 
Jewish for any other reason. For a more detailed discussion of  the methodology for identifying Jew-
ish Americans, see PRRI’s 2012 Jewish Values Survey. http://publicreligion.org/research/2012/04/
jewish-values-in-2012/
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Community Context
Number of Immigrants in Local Community 
Americans’ exposure to new immigrants varies considerably. Roughly equal numbers 
say they live in a community with many new immigrants (24%), some new immigrants 
(23%), only a few new immigrants (23%) or almost no new immigrants (27%). There are 
no large political or regional differences on this question. However, there are significant 
divisions by community type, race and ethnicity, religious affiliation, and generation.
A majority (53%) of Americans who live in urban areas say their community has some 
or many new immigrants, compared to less than one-third (32%) of Americans who 
live in rural areas. 
Asian Americans are more likely than other racial and ethnic groups to report that 
they live in a community with some or many new immigrants. Nearly two-thirds 
Asian Americans (66%) say they live in a community with some or many new immi-
grants, compared to a slim majority (51%) of Hispanic Americans, nearly half (46%) 
of white Americans, and 4-in-10 (40%) black Americans. Majorities of black (57%) 
and white (51%) Americans report that they live in a community with only a few new 
immigrants or almost no new immigrants.
Proximity to immigrants varies by religious affiliation: Mormons (59%), Hispan-
ic Catholics (53%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (51%), and Jewish Americans 
(51%) are somewhat more likely than white Catholics (44%), white mainline Protes-
tants (44%), white evangelical Protestants (43%), and black Protestants (35%) to report 
that they live in a community with some or many new immigrants.
There are also some divisions by generation. A majority (51%) of Millennials (age 
18-29) report that they live in a community with some or many new immigrants, com-
pared to 36% of seniors (age 65 and older). More than 6-in-10 (61%) seniors say they 
live in a community with only a few new immigrants or almost no new immigrants. 
The Social Context: 
Experience with 
Immigrants and 
Immigration
13
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Frequency of Contact With People Who 
Speak Little or No English
Fully half (50%) of Americans say they often come in contact with immigrants who 
speak little or no English. About one-quarter (26%) say they sometimes interact with 
immigrants who speak little or no English, and less than one-quarter say they rarely 
(18%) or never (5%) come in contact with immigrants who speak little or no English. 
There are few political divisions on this question. However, Hispanic Americans 
(65%) are more likely than black (48%), white (47%), or Asian (41%) Americans to 
report that they come in contact with immigrants who speak little or no English often. 
Hearing About Immigration in Church
Most religious Americans are not hearing frequently about the issue of immigration in 
church. Among those who attend church at least once or twice a month, roughly 1-in-
5 say their clergy leader speaks about the issue of immigration sometimes (16%) or 
often (6%). About one-quarter (27%) of regular church attenders say that their clergy 
leader speaks about the issue of immigration rarely, and nearly half (49%) report that 
their clergy leader never speaks about the issue of immigration. 
Hispanic Catholics (54%) are the only religious group among whom a majority report 
that their clergy leader speaks about the issue of immigration sometimes or often. 
Nearly 4-in-10 (38%) Hispanic Protestants6 also say that they hear about immigration 
sometimes or often in church, although more than 6-in-10 say they hear about immi-
gration rarely (16%) or never (46%). Majorities of black Protestants (51%), white evan-
gelical Protestants (52%), and white mainline Protestants (56%) say their clergy leader 
never speaks out about the issue of immigration.
Similarly, nearly half (45%) of Hispanic Americans who attend church at least once 
or twice a month say their clergy leader speaks out about immigration sometimes or 
often, compared to 26% of black regular church attenders and 17% of white regular 
church attenders. 
Friends and Family
Friends Born Outside the U.S. 
More than 6-in-10 (61%) Americans say they have a close friend who was born outside 
the U.S., while nearly 4-in-10 (39%) say they do not. There are divisions on this question 
by religious affiliation, race and ethnicity, generation, class, region, and community type.
6 The sample size for Hispanic Protestants is small (N=97) and should be interpreted with caution.
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Although majorities of most religious groups report that they have a close friend who 
was born abroad, minority religious groups are more likely than other groups to report 
that this is true of them. Hispanic Catholics (86%), Jewish Americans (77%), Hispanic 
Protestants (75%), Mormons (69%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (64%) are 
more likely than white Catholics (55%), white mainline Protestants (55%), white evan-
gelical Protestants (52%), and black Protestants (47%) to say they have a close friend 
who was born outside the country. A majority (52%) of black Protestants say they do 
not have a close friend who was born outside the U.S. 
Similarly, Asian (89%) and Hispanic (81%) Americans are more likely than white 
(57%) or black (52%) Americans to report that they have a close friend who was born 
outside the U.S.
Millennials (68%) are twenty percentage points more likely than seniors (48%) to say 
they have a close friend who was born outside the U.S. White college-educated Ameri-
cans (68%) are also nearly twenty percentage points more likely than white working-
class Americans (49%) to report that they have a close friend born outside the country, 
although this varies significantly by age.7
Americans who live in urban areas (65%) are also more likely than Americans who 
live in rural areas (48%) to say they have a close friend who was born outside the U.S. 
Meanwhile, Americans from the West (71%) and Northeast (66%) are more likely than 
Americans who live in the South (57%) and Midwest (52%) to report that they have a 
close friend who was born outside the country.
First, Second, and Third-Generation Americans 
Most Americans (82%) are at least third-generation, which means that they were born 
in the United States to American-born parents. Four percent of Americans are second-
generation, born in the U.S. to foreign-born parents. More than 1-in-10 (13%) Ameri-
cans, meanwhile, are first-generation, meaning that they were born in another country.
There are sizeable divisions by race and ethnicity. Half (50%) of first-generation Amer-
icans are Hispanic, while slightly more than 1-in-5 (21%) are white, and approximately 
1-in-10 are Asian (12%) or black (11%). Similarly, a plurality (44%) of second-generation 
Americans are Hispanic, while one-third (33%) are white, 12% are Asian, and 4% are 
black. The vast majority (75%) of third-generation Americans are white, while more 
than 1-in-10 (12%) are black, and less than 1-in-10 are Hispanic (7%) or Asian (1%).
7 Generally speaking, “white working-class Americans” are defined as non-hispanic whites with no 
college degree who are paid by the hour or by the job. For a full definition of  “white working-class 
Americans” and “white college-educated Americans” as used in this report, see PRRI, Race, Class, 
and Culture Survey, September 2012 (N=2,501). http://publicreligion.org/research/2012/09/race-
class-culture-survey-2012/
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Knowledge of Family’s Immigration Story
Nearly 7-in-10 Americans say they know the story of how their family first came to the 
U.S. somewhat (26%) or very (43%) well. Less than 3-in-10 (29%) say they know their 
family’s immigration story not too well or not at all well. There are few differences by 
political affiliation and generation. However, there are variations according to race 
and ethnicity, religious affiliation, and class.
Majorities of all racial and ethnic groups say they know the story of how their family 
came to the U.S. somewhat or very well. However, Asian (58%) and Hispanic (54%) 
Americans are more likely than black (44%) and white (39%) Americans to say that 
they know the story of how their family came to the U.S. very well.
Similarly, there are variations among religious groups. Hispanic Catholics (81%), Mor-
mons (76%), Jewish Americans (76%), white Catholics (73%), and white mainline 
Protestants (70%) are more likely than white evangelical Protestants (63%) and black 
Protestants (59%) to say they know the story of how their family came to the U.S. 
somewhat or very well. 
There are also gaps according to social class. White college-educated Americans (76%) 
are more likely than white working-class Americans (61%) to say they know the story 
of how their family first came to the U.S. somewhat or very well.
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The Changing Racial and Religious Landscape
The face of American society has changed dramatically over the course of a single 
generation, in part due to new immigration, birth rates, and shifting patterns of reli-
gious affiliation. American society, which for most of its history has been predomi-
nantly white Christian, is quickly becoming a racially and religiously multi-cultural 
nation. Currently, 65% of Americans identify as white, non-Hispanic, 11% as black, 
non-Hispanic, 14% as Hispanic, 3% as Asian, and 7% as mixed race or some other 
race. However, these patterns mask dramatic differences by age.
The racial differences between seniors, America’s oldest adults, and Millennials, 
America’s youngest adults, are dramatic. More than 8-in-10 (82%) seniors (age 65 and 
older) identify as white, compared to 9% who identify as black, 5% as Hispanic, 1% 
as Asian and 4% as some other race or mixed race. By contrast, only a slim major-
ity (52%) of Millennials (age 18-29) identify as white, while nearly one-quarter (23%) 
identify as Hispanic, 12% identify as black, 5% as Asian, and close to 1-in-10 (8%) as 
some other race or mixed race.
The religious differences between these two generations are equally strong. More than 
7-in-10 (71%) seniors identify as some type of white Christian, including white evan-
gelical Protestant (29%) white mainline Protestant (23%), or white Catholic (17%). In 
contrast, less than 3-in-10 (28%) of Millennials identify as white Christian (10% white 
evangelical Protestant, 9% white mainline Protestant, and 6% white Catholic). Seniors 
are about three times more likely than Millennials to identify as white Catholic (17% 
vs. 6%). Conversely, Hispanic Catholics make up a much larger proportion of Mil-
lennials (10%) than seniors (3%). Among Americans under the age of 30, the major-
ity (56%) of Catholics are now Hispanic. One other important religious difference 
separating seniors and Millennials is the number of each who identify as religiously 
unaffiliated. Nearly one-third (31%) of Millennials identify as religiously unaffiliated, 
compared to roughly 1-in-10 (11%) seniors. Millennials (13%) are also about four times 
more likely than seniors (3%) to identify as atheist or agnostic.
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Differences in Religious Affiliation 
By Age Group
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Feelings of Nostalgia and Cultural Protectionism
Perceptions of Changes Since 1950’s
These significant demographic differences are reflected in sharply contrasting views 
about how American culture and way of life has changed since the 1950s. A majority 
(54%) of Americans say that since the 1950s, American culture and way of life has 
mostly changed for the worse, while 4-in-10 (40%) say it has mostly changed for the 
better. There are profound differences by political affiliation, religious affiliation, race 
and ethnicity, and generation. Notably, there are no significant differences by gender.
Political differences on this question are quite pronounced. Roughly three-quarters of 
Americans who identify with the Tea Party movement (76%) and Republicans (73%), 
as well as a majority (56%) of political independents, believe that American culture and 
way of life has changed for the worse. A majority (55%) of Democrats disagree, saying 
that American culture and way of life has changed for the better since the 1950s.
White Christians strongly embrace the belief that American culture has changed for 
the worse since the 1950s. Three-quarters (75%) of white evangelical Protestants and 
more than 6-in-10 white mainline Protestants (61%) and white Catholics (62%) say 
American culture and way of life has changed for the worse over the past half-cen-
tury. Majorities of Hispanic Protestants (54%) and Mormons (54%) also agree that 
American culture and way of life has mostly changed for the worse. By contrast, nearly 
two-thirds of Jewish Americans (65%) and majorities of Hispanic Catholics (57%) and 
black Protestants (58%) believe that American culture has changed for the better. 
There are also significant racial divisions, with 61% of white Americans reporting that 
American culture has changed for the worse, while majorities of Asian (65%), black 
(56%), and Hispanic (51%) Americans report that things have improved since the 1950s.
Nostalgic feelings about America’s past are much more apparent among those who 
lived during the 1950s. Nearly two-thirds (66%) of seniors believe that American cul-
ture has changed for the worse since that time, while a slim majority (51%) of Millen-
nials say that American society has mostly changed for the better.
Concerns About Foreign Influence
Americans are more divided over whether the American way of life needs to be pro-
tected against foreign influence: a majority (53%) agree, while 45% disagree. Political, 
religious and generational divisions on this question are substantial.
Nearly 7-in-10 (68%) Republicans agree that the American way of life needs to be pro-
tected, compared to roughly half of Democrats (45%) and independents (51%). Three-
quarters (75%) of Americans who identify with the Tea Party believe that the American 
way of life needs to be protected, including nearly half (46%) who completely agree.
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Most Christians, regardless of race or ethnicity, believe that the American way of life 
needs to be protected from foreign influence, including 69% of white evangelical Prot-
estants, 65% of black Protestants, 59% of Hispanic Protestants, 57% of white Catholics, 
and 53% of white mainline Protestants. Hispanic Catholics are roughly evenly divided: 
half (50%) agree that the American way of life needs to be protected from foreign influ-
ence, while 46% disagree. Nearly 7-in-10 (68%) Jewish Americans, nearly 6-in-10 (58%) 
religiously unaffiliated Americans, and 52% of Mormons disagree that the American 
way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence.
There are also some generational divides. More than 6-in-10 (64%) seniors agree that 
the American way of life needs to be protected from foreign influence, compared to 
only 41% of Millennials.
Concerns About a Majority-Minority Nation
Despite feelings of nostalgia about mid-twentieth century culture, most Americans 
say that an idea of an America where the majority of the population is not white does 
not bother them. Only 14% of Americans report that they would be bothered by this 
notion, while more than 8-in-10 (84%) disagree. There are only modest differences 
by political affiliation. Less than 1-in-5 (18%) Republicans agree that a majority non-
white America would bother them, compared to 14% of Democrats and 11% of inde-
pendents. Nearly one-in-four (23%) Americans who identify with the Tea Party say 
that the idea of an America where most people are not white bothers them.
Survey Experiment: How Many Statements Worry or Bother You? 
Control 
Group
Treatment 
Group
A An America where gay and lesbian marriages are accepted A
B
An America where there are more foreign cars than Ameri-
can made cars on the road
B
C
An America where religious groups have a lot of influence 
on public policy
C
--
An America where most people are not white (Treatment 
statement)
D
1.39
(out of 3) Average number of statements selected
1.62
(out of 4)
However, on issue of race, previous research (Sniderman and Carmines 1997) suggests 
that survey respondents may misrepresent their actual views on sensitive topics to live 
interviewers if these views are not consistent with what respondents believe is a socially 
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desirable response. In order to measure whether a “social desirability effect” was oper-
ative when respondents were asked whether the idea of an America where most people 
are not white bothers them, a controlled experiment was conducted in a follow-up 
survey among a nationally representative sample of American adults (N=1,028).8 The 
experiment, commonly known as a List Experiment, randomly divides the sample 
into two demographically identical groups, a control group and a treatment group. 
Each group was read a list of statements and instructed to report how many state-
ments—not which specific statements—would bother or worry them. The first group 
was read a list of three control statements (A-C below), while the second group was 
read an identical list of statements with an additional fourth statement, the treatment 
statement: “An America where most people are not white.”
Thus, Americans who are reluctant to assert directly to an interviewer that an America 
where most people are not white bothers them were given a way to register this con-
cern indirectly. Unless a respondent selected all four statements, which occurred in 
only 7% of all cases, they could be assured that the interviewer would not know which 
specific statements bothered them. Given that respondents were randomly assigned to 
the two groups, the only reason for a difference in the average number of statements 
selected by each group is the selection of the treatment statement. Therefore, by sub-
tracting the average number of statements selected by the treatment group from the 
average number of statements selected by the control group, the experiment reveals an 
estimate of the percentage of Americans who are bothered by the idea of an America 
where most people are not white.
The List Experiment demonstrates that significantly more Americans overall are will-
ing to say that the idea of an America where most people are not white bothers them 
when asked indirectly (23%), compared to when they are asked directly (14%). Among 
white non-Hispanic Americans, the gap between indirect and direct measures on this 
question doubles from 9 points to 18 points; only 13% of non-Hispanic whites say the 
idea of an American where most people are not white bothers them, but when given 
the opportunity to register this view indirectly, more than 3-in-10 (31%) do so. 
The New American Community: Impact of 
Immigrants and Social Groups
Impact of Newcomers From Other Countries
A majority (54%) of Americans believe that the growing numbers of newcomers 
from other countries help strengthen American society, while a significant minority 
(40%) say that newcomers threaten traditional American customs and values. Views 
about immigrants’ contributions have been stable since 2011, when 53% of the public 
8 PRRI, Religion & Politics Tracking Survey, March 2012 (N=1,028).
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believed that newcomers were strengthening American society.9 However, there are 
yawning differences of opinion by political affiliation and generation.
Six-in-ten (60%) Americans who identify with the Tea Party and a smaller majori-
ty (55%) of Republicans believe that the growing number of newcomers from other 
countries threaten American customs. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Democrats and a 
majority (54%) of independents believe the opposite—that the growing numbers of 
newcomers make America stronger. 
Younger Americans exhibit more positive sentiments about the contributions of immi-
grants than do older Americans. Nearly 7-in-10 (68%) Millennials believe that immi-
grants coming to the U.S. strengthen society. By contrast, seniors are nearly evenly 
divided, with 46% saying that immigrants constitute a threat to traditional American 
customs and 44% saying that they benefit American society. These generational divides 
are also evident within the political parties. A majority (52%) of Millennial Republicans 
agree that immigrants strengthen American society, compared to only one-third (33%) 
of senior Republicans. There is an equally large generational divide among Demo-
crats. Nearly three-quarters (74%) of Millennial Democrats say immigrants strengthen 
American society, compared to a smaller majority (52%) of senior Democrats.
Influence of Groups on American Culture
Americans hold mixed views about certain social groups’ influence on American 
culture and way of life, and there are no groups whose effects are perceived to be 
wholly positive or negative. However, some groups, including Asians (40% better vs. 
9% worse), Hispanics (39% better vs. 20% worse), immigrants (38% better vs. 28% 
worse), and young people (43% better vs. 30% worse), are viewed, on balance, as more 
likely to be changing American culture for the better than they are to be changing it 
for the worse. 
On the other hand, by a nearly 4-to-1 margin, Americans believe that atheists are 
changing American culture for the worse (39%) rather than for the better (10%). 
There is roughly a 2-to-1 gap in views about the impact of non-religious people (31% 
worse vs. 16% better). The Tea Party (30% worse vs. 24% better), gay and lesbian 
people (29% worse vs. 24% better) and Muslims (27% worse vs. 18% better) are also 
perceived as having a somewhat more negative than positive impact on American cul-
ture and way of life.
There are sizable political differences in perceptions of these groups’ social impact. 
The biggest difference between Republicans and Democrats is, not surprisingly, in 
views of the Tea Party. Nearly half (47%) of Democrats say that the Tea Party is chang-
ing American culture and way of life for the worse, compared to 10% of Republicans. 
By contrast, nearly half (48%) of Republicans say the Tea Party is changing American 
culture and way of life for the better. 
9 PRRI, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, September 2011 (N=2,450).
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There are also political divisions in Americans’ perceptions of atheists, gay and lesbian 
people, immigrants, and Muslims. Nearly 6-in-10 (59%) Republicans say that athe-
ists are changing American culture for the worse, compared to one-third (33%) of 
Democrats. Roughly half (49%) of Republicans say that gay and lesbian people are 
also changing American culture for the worse, compared to 1-in-5 (20%) Demo-
crats. Republicans (40%) are also about twice as likely as Democrats (21%) to say that 
immigrants are changing American way of life for the worse. Americans who identify 
with the Tea Party do not differ substantially from Republicans in their views of most 
groups, with two exceptions. Members of the Tea Party are more likely than Republi-
cans to say that Muslims (54% vs. 45%) and gay and lesbian people (57% and 49%) are 
changing American society for the worse.
Perceptions of How Groups Are Changing 
American Culture and Way of Life
Source: Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013 (N=4,465).
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The generational gaps are similarly substantial. Overall, Millennials are more like-
ly than seniors to perceive all social groups, with the exception of the Tea Party, as 
having positive impact on American culture. The largest divides between Millennials 
and seniors are in views of atheists, gay and lesbian people, and Muslims. A majority 
(55%) of seniors say that atheists are changing American culture and way of life for 
the worse, compared to less than 1-in-4 (24%) Millennials. More than 4-in-10 (44%) 
seniors say that gay and lesbian people are changing American culture for the worse, 
compared to 14% of Millennials. There is a similar gap in views about Muslims, with 
40% of seniors saying they are changing American culture for the worse compared to 
12% of Millennials. Millennials (50%) are also more likely than seniors (37%) to see 
young people’s contribution to American culture as positive.
Impact of Immigrants on Local Communities 
and American Society
Americans generally perceive that immigrants are having more of an impact on Amer-
ican society than on their own communities. Less than one-third (32%) of Ameri-
cans say that immigrants today are changing their community a lot, 46% say they are 
changing it a little, and roughly 1-in-5 (21%) say they are not having any impact. Mean-
while, close to half (46%) of Americans say immigrants today are changing American 
32 31 
27 
36 
46 
38 
44 
53 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
All Americans Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Perceptions of Immigrants Changing 
Community vs. Society 
By Political Ideology 
Immigrants today are changing your community and way of  life a lot 
Immigrants today are changing American society and way of  life a lot 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
Perceptions of Immigrants Changing Community vs. Society 
By Political Ideology
32 31 
27 
36 
46 
38 
44 
53 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
All Americans Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Perceptions of Immigrants Changing 
Commu ity vs. Society 
By Political Ideology 
Immigrants today are changing your community and way of  life a lot 
Immigrants today are changing American society and way of  life a lot 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
32 31 
27 
36 
46 
38 
44 
53 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
All Americans Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Perceptions of Immigrants Changing 
Community vs. Society 
By Political Ideology 
Immigrants today are changing your community and way of  life a lot 
Immigrants today are changing American society and way of  life a lot 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013 (N=4,465).
25
Citizenship, Values, and Cultural Concerns: What Americans Want From Immigration Reform
society a lot, 45% say they are changing it a little, and less than 1-in-10 (8%) say they 
are not having any impact. 
Views about immigrants’ impact on American society are strongly associated with 
political ideology. Conservatives (36%) and liberals (31%) are about equally as likely 
to say that immigrants are changing their own communities a lot. However, conser-
vatives (53%) are more likely than liberals (38%) to say that immigrants are changing 
American society a lot.
Americans who believe immigrants are having at last some impact are significantly 
more likely to say that immigrants’ influence on their own community is good (54%) 
rather than bad (37%). Views about immigrants’ impact on American society are more 
divided. Half (50%) of Americans say that these changes are a good thing, while more 
than 4-in-10 (41%) disagree, saying they are a bad thing. There are significant differ-
ences by political affiliation.
Among Americans who say that immigrants are changing their community at least a 
little, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to believe that immigrants’ influ-
ence on their community and American society more broadly is a good thing. Demo-
crats (65%) are significantly more likely than Republicans (40%) or members of the 
Tea Party (30%) to say this influence is a good thing. Six-in-ten (60%) Americans who 
identify with the Tea Party and a majority (52%) of Republicans say this is a bad thing. 
The pattern of responses is similar in views about immigrants’ impact on American 
society as a whole.
Immigrants’ Perceptions of Themselves 
as Americans 
Overall, nearly 6-in-10 (59%) Americans believe that immigrants today think of them-
selves as Americans, much like immigrants from previous eras, while 36% disagree.
Majorities of Democrats (66%), independents (59%), and Republicans (51%) agree that 
immigrants today think of themselves as Americans just as much as immigrants from 
earlier eras did. By contrast, 44% of Americans who identify with the Tea Party agree 
with this statement, while a majority (52%) disagree.
There are few racial differences on this question. More than 6-in-10 Asian (64%), 
black (64%), and Hispanic (63%) Americans believe that immigrants today are just as 
likely to think of themselves as Americans as immigrants from earlier eras did, as well 
as 57% of white Americans.
Majorities of all religious groups, including 68% of Jewish Americans, 66% of Hispanic 
Catholics, 64% of Hispanic Protestants, 63% of religiously unaffiliated Americans, 61% 
of black Protestants, 59% of white Catholics, 56% of white mainline Protestants, 54% 
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of Mormons, and 51% of white evangelical Protestants, agree that immigrants today 
think of themselves as Americans just as much as immigrants from other eras did.
Interestingly, first-generation Americans (62%) are about equally as likely as second-
generation (64%) and third-generation (58%) Americans to say that immigrants today 
think of themselves as Americans just as much as immigrants from earlier eras did.
Immigrants’ Impact on Jobs and the Economy
Although most Americans agree that immigrants coming to the U.S. today take jobs 
that most Americans don’t want, they also express significant concern about illegal 
immigrants’ effect on wages. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Americans agree that immi-
grants coming to this country today mostly take jobs that Americans don’t want, while 
less than 1-in-3 (27%) say that immigrants take jobs away from American citizens. 
Meanwhile, a majority (56%) of Americans also agree that illegal immigrants hurt the 
economy by driving down wages for many Americans, while more than one-third 
(36%) say they help the economy by providing low-cost labor. There is a general con-
sensus among political, racial, and religious groups that immigrants mostly take jobs 
that Americans don’t want. There is, however, less agreement among these groups on 
illegal immigrants’ overall effect on the economy.
While majorities of Democrats (69%), independents (64%), and Republicans (56%) 
agree that immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs Americans don’t 
want, there is less agreement on whether illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driv-
ing down wages. Two-thirds (67%) of Republicans and a majority (55%) of indepen-
dents agree that illegal immigrants mostly hurt the economy by driving down wages 
for many Americans, while Democrats are more divided. Nearly half (49%) of Demo-
crats agree that illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving down wages, while 
more than 4-in-10 (43%) disagree, saying that illegal immigrants help the economy by 
providing low-cost labor.
Nearly 8-in-10 (79%) Hispanic Americans and approximately 6-in-10 white (62%) and 
black (59%) Americans agree that immigrants coming to the country today mostly 
take jobs Americans don’t want. However, there are significant levels of disagreement 
on whether illegal immigrants help or hurt the economy. Six-in-ten white (60%) and 
black (60%) Americans agree that illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving 
down wages for many Americans, while nearly as many (59%) Hispanic Americans 
disagree, saying that illegal immigrants help the economy by providing low-cost labor.
There are sizeable class divisions on immigrants’ impact on jobs and the economy. 
Although majorities of white working-class (52%) and white college-educated Ameri-
cans (75%) agree that immigrants coming to the U.S. today mostly take jobs Ameri-
cans don’t want, a sizeable minority (39%) of white working-class Americans disagree, 
saying that immigrants mostly take jobs away from American citizens. Similarly, while 
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more than 7-in-10 (71%) white working-class Americans agree that illegal immigrants 
mostly hurt the economy by driving down wages, only 42% of white college-educated 
Americans agree. Half (50%) of white college-educated Americans say illegal immi-
grants help the economy by providing low-cost labor.
Some of the largest divisions in views about the impact of illegal immigrants are 
between first-generation and third-generation Americans. Nearly 8-in-10 first-genera-
tion (78%) Americans agree that immigrants coming to the U.S. today mostly take jobs 
Americans don’t want, compared to 61% of third-generation Americans. Meanwhile, 
nearly 6-in-10 (58%) first-generation Americans also believe that illegal immigrants 
mostly help the economy by providing low-cost labor, while 61% of third-generation 
Americans say illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving down wages.
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Knowledge of Deportation Rates
Overall, most Americans are not aware of changes in deportation rates over the past 
few years. Although deportations have increased since the beginning of the Obama 
administration, a plurality (42%) of Americans believe that the number of illegal 
immigrants who were deported back to their home countries has stayed the same over 
the past five or six years, while nearly 1-in-5 (18%) say deportations have decreased, 
and less than 3-in-10 (28%) correctly state that they have increased.10
Democrats (32%) and independents (29%) are more likely than Republicans (21%) to 
correctly report that the number of deportations has increased over the past five or six 
years. By contrast, Republicans (25%) are nearly twice as likely as Democrats (13%) to 
report that the number of immigrants who were deported back to their home coun-
tries has decreased over the past five or six years. 
One of the most substantial knowledge gaps on this question is between different 
racial and ethnic groups. Close to half (46%) of Hispanic Americans correctly report 
that the number of illegal immigrants who were deported back to their home coun-
tries has increased over the past five or six years, compared to 34% of Asian Ameri-
cans, 31% of black Americans, and less than one-quarter (24%) of white Americans.
First-generation Americans are also more likely than second-generation or third-
generation Americans to correctly identify deportation trends. Nearly half (47%) of 
first-generation Americans report that the number of illegal immigrants who were 
deported back to their home countries has increased over the past five or six years, 
compared to more than one-third (35%) of second-generation Americans and one-
quarter (25%) of third-generation Americans.  
10 According to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), deportations increased by more 
than 10% between FY 2008, when nearly 370,000 immigrants were deported, and FY 2012, when 
about 410,000 immigrants were deported. See ICE’s official website (http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
about/offices/ero/pdf/ero-removals.pdf  and http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/), accessed 
March 12, 2013.
Immigration Reform 
Policy and Values5
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Condition of the Immigration System
On the whole, most Americans believe the immigration system in the United States is 
broken. Less than 1-in-10 (7%) Americans believe that the immigration system is gen-
erally working, while 29% say it is working but with some major problems. Four-in-ten 
(40%) Americans report that the current immigration system is broken but working in 
some areas, while 23% say it is completely broken.
Public opinion on this question has remained relatively stable since 2010, when 7% 
reported that the immigration system was generally working, about one-third (34%) 
reported that it was working but with some major problems, roughly one-third (35%) 
Americans reported that it was broken but working in some areas, and more than 1-in-
5 (21%) said it was completely broken.11 
There are modest partisan differences in views of the immigration system. More than 
7-in-10 Republicans (73%) say that the immigration system is mostly or completely 
broken, compared to 62% of independents and 57% of Democrats. 
There are sizeable racial gaps, with Asian Americans standing out as one of the few 
groups expressing more optimistic views about the functionality of the immigration 
system. Nearly 6-in-10 (59%) Asians Americans say the immigration system is either 
generally working or working with some major problems, compared to approximately 
4-in-10 Hispanic Americans (41%) and black Americans (38%), and one-third (33%) of 
white Americans. Majorities of white (65%), black (61%), and Hispanic (57%) Ameri-
cans say the immigration system is either mostly or completely broken.
Immigration Reform Policy
A Path to Citizenship for Illegal Immigrants
There is a general consensus among Americans that the immigration system should 
include an earned path to citizenship for immigrants who are currently living in the U.S. 
illegally, while few Americans favor an approach that focuses exclusively on deportation. 
When asked a binary question, Americans are substantially more likely to say that 
the best way to solve the country’s illegal immigration problem is to both secure our 
borders and provide an earned path to citizenship for illegal immigrants already in the 
country (68%) than they are to say that the best way to solve this problem is to secure 
our borders and arrest and deport all those who are here illegally (29%). Support for 
an earned path to citizenship has increased by six points since 2011, when Americans 
were also more likely to prefer the comprehensive approach (62%) over the enforce-
ment-only approach (36%).12
11 PRRI, Religion, Values, and Immigration Survey, March 2010 (N=1,201).
12 PRRI, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, September 2011 (N=2,450).
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Americans also strongly support a path to citizenship when asked a three-part ques-
tion that includes an option for permanent legal residency. More than 6-in-10 (63%) 
Americans agree that the immigration system should deal with immigrants who are 
currently living in the U.S. illegally by allowing them a way to become citizens pro-
vided they meet certain requirements. Less than 1-in-5 (14%) say they should be per-
mitted to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens, and approximately 1-in-5 
(21%) say they should be identified and deported.
Although majorities of all partisan groups favor an earned path to citizenship for 
immigrants currently living in the U.S. illegally, there are significant variations in 
intensity. More than 7-in-10 (71%) Democrats, 64% of independents, and a majority 
(53%) of Republicans favor an earned path to citizenship. Similar numbers of Demo-
crats (13%), independents (14%), and Republicans (13%) favor a path to legal residen-
cy, but not citizenship. Nearly one-third (32%) of Republicans, more than 1-in-5 (21%) 
independents, and approximately 1-in-10 (13%) Democrats favor deportation. 
How should the immigration system deal with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Affiliation
45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
32 
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
Republican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the immigration system deal 
with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirements 
Allow them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens 
Identify and deport them 
None of  these/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
32 
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
Republican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the i migration system deal 
with ill gal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirements 
Allow them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens 
Identify and deport them 
None of  these/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
32 
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
Republican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the im igration system deal 
with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirements 
Allow them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens 
Identify and deport them 
None of  these/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
32 
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
Republican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the immigration system deal 
with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow th m a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirements 
Allow them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens 
Identify and deport them 
None of  these/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
32 
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
Republican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the immigration system deal 
with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirem nts 
Allow them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens 
Identify and deport them 
None of  these/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
32 
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
Republican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the immigr ti  system deal 
with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirements 
Allow them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens 
Identify and deport them 
None of  the e/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
3  
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
R ublican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the immigrati  syste  de l 
with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow t em a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
require nts 
All w them to become permanent legal residents, but not citizens 
Identify and deport them 
None of  these/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
45 
53 
64 
71 
63 
16 
13 
14 
13 
14 
36 
32 
21 
13 
21 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Tea Party 
Republican 
Independent  
Democrat 
All Americans 
How should the immigrati  system deal 
with illegal immigrants? 
By Party Afﬁliation 
Allow them a way to become citizens provided they meet certain 
requirem nts 
ll  t e  to become permanent legal residents, but not citize s 
Identify and deport them 
No e of  these/DK/Refused 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013  (N=4,465). 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013 (N=4,465).
31
Citizenship, Values, and Cultural Concerns: What Americans Want From Immigration Reform
There are significant differences between two important constituencies that tend to 
support the Republican Party: white evangelical Protestants and Americans who iden-
tify with the Tea Party. A majority (56%) of white evangelical Protestants support a 
path to citizenship for immigrants living in the U.S. illegally, compared to less than 
half (45%) of Tea Party members. A majority of Americans who identify with the Tea 
Party say that immigrants in the U.S. illegally should be allowed to apply only for 
permanent residency status and not citizenship (16%) or be deported (36%). Nearly 
6-in-10 (59%) white evangelical Protestants who do not identify with the Tea Party 
support a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, compared to 41% of white evan-
gelicals Protestants who also identify with the Tea Party (sometimes referred to as 
“Teavangelicals” [Brody 2012]), and 47% of Tea Party members who do not identify 
as evangelical.
Majorities of all religious groups, including Hispanic Catholics (74%), Hispanic Prot-
estants (71%), black Protestants (70%), Jewish Americans (67%), Mormons (63%), 
white Catholics (62%), white mainline Protestants (61%), and white evangelical Prot-
estants (56%) agree that the immigration system should allow immigrants currently 
living in the U.S. illegally to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements.
With the exception of Asian Americans, solid majorities of all racial and ethnic groups 
favor allowing immigrants currently living in the U.S. illegally to become citizens 
provided they meet certain requirements, although there are some notable variations. 
Approximately 7-in-10 Hispanic (71%) and black (68%) Americans favor an earned 
path to citizenship, as do more than 6-in-10 (61%) white Americans. By contrast, half 
(50%) of Asian Americans favor a path to citizenship. Asian Americans are, however, 
more than twice as likely to favor allowing illegal immigrants to become permanent 
legal residents but not citizens (32%), as they are to believe that they should be iden-
tified and deported (15%). Meanwhile, white Americans are twice as likely to favor 
deportation for illegal immigrants (25%) as they are to favor legal residency only (12%). 
Deportation and “Self-Deportation”
Most Americans remain opposed to an immigration strategy that focuses exclusively 
on deportation, although support for this option is higher than when paired with alter-
natives. A majority (55%) of Americans disagree that we should make a serious effort to 
deport all illegal immigrants back to their home countries, while approximately 4-in-10 
(43%) agree with this policy. Public opinion on this question is essentially unchanged 
since 2010, when 56% opposed a deportation-only approach and 42% were in favor.13
Even fewer Americans favor a policy colloquially known as “self-deportation,” in 
which conditions are made so difficult for illegal immigrants that they return to their 
home country on their own. More than one-third (34%) of Americans agree that this 
is the best way to solve the country’s illegal immigration problem, while nearly two-
thirds (64%) disagree.
13 PRRI, Religion, Values, and Immigration Survey, March 2010 (N=1,201).
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Support for “Self-Deportation” Strategy: 
Making Conditions So Difficult for Illegal Immigrants 
That They Voluntarily Return to Their Home Countries 
By Party Affiliation
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country’s illegal immigration problem, although there are varying levels of opposition. 
More than 7-in-10 (72%) Democrats and nearly two-thirds (65%) of independents 
oppose a self-deportation approach to immigration. A majority (53%) of Republicans 
are also opposed, although 45% are in favor of such a proposal. By contrast, a majority 
(56%) of Americans who identify with the Tea Party agree that the best way to solve 
the country’s illegal immigration problem is to make conditions so difficult for illegal 
immigrants that they return to their home country on their own. 
There are also significant generational divisions among both Democrats and Repub-
licans. Among Republicans, a majority (52%) of seniors (age 65 and older) agree that a 
self-deportation strategy is the best solution to the country’s illegal immigration prob-
lem, compared to roughly 4-in-10 (39%) Millennial Republicans (age 18-29. More than 
one-third (34%) of senior Democrats favor a self-deportation strategy, compared to 
19% of Millennial Democrats.
The DREAM Act 
More than 6-in-10 (61%) Americans favor allowing illegal immigrants brought to the 
U.S. as children to gain legal resident status if they join the military or go to college, a 
policy which comprises the basic elements of the DREAM Act. Approximately one-
third (34%) of Americans are opposed to this policy. Perspectives on this issue have 
Source: Public Religion Research Institute/Brookings, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, March 2013 (N=4,465).
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not changed substantially since 2011, when nearly 6-in-10 (57%) Americans favored 
the basic tenets of the DREAM Act and 4-in-10 (40%) were opposed.14
More than 7-in-10 (72%) Democrats and 6-in-10 (60%) independents favor the basic 
tenets of the DREAM Act. Republicans are evenly divided, with 48% in favor of the 
basic elements of the DREAM Act, and 48% opposed.  
With the exception of white evangelical Protestants, all religious groups, including 83% 
of Hispanic Catholics, 78% of Mormons, 71% of Jewish Americans, 68% of Hispanic 
Protestants, 64% of black Protestants, 58% of white mainline Protestants, and 55% of 
white Catholics, favor the basic tenets of the DREAM Act. White evangelical Protestants 
are divided, with 47% in favor of the basic tenets of the DREAM Act, and 48% opposed.
Majorities of all racial and ethnic groups favor allowing illegal immigrants brought to 
the U.S. as children to gain legal resident status if they join the military or go to col-
lege, but there are some variations in intensity. Approximately three-quarters of His-
panic (77%) and Asian (74%) Americans favor the basic tenets of the DREAM Act, 
compared to 64% of black Americans and 58% of white Americans.
First-generation (79%) and second-generation (77%) Americans are substantially more 
likely than third-generation Americans (58%) to favor the basic tenets of the DREAM Act. 
Other Immigration Policies
Americans exhibit strong support for several policies that have been debated as part 
of a larger package of immigration reform legislation. More than 8-in-10 (81%) Ameri-
cans favor creating a database that would allow employers to verify the immigration 
status of new hires, three-quarters (75%) of Americans favor allowing immigrants 
who get degrees from U.S. colleges or universities in math, science, or technology to 
work legally in the U.S., and 72% of Americans favor expanding “guest worker” pro-
grams that would give a temporary visa to non-citizens who want to work legally in 
the U.S. There is strong support for these policies across various subgroups.
Preferences for Different Groups of Immigrants 
There is a general consensus that immigrants with family members living in the U.S. 
legally, as well as immigrants who attended an American college or university, should 
be given preference by the immigration system, even if it means others may have to 
wait longer. Approximately 6-in-10 Americans agree that immigrants seeking legal 
status who have a spouse currently living in the U.S. legally (63%), have children or 
parents currently living in the U.S. legally (60%), or have a degree from an American 
college or university (59%) should be given preference by the immigration system, 
14 PRRI, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, September 2011 (N=2,450).
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even if it means less space for others. Americans are nearly evenly divided on whether 
immigrants who can speak English fluently should be given preference by the immi-
gration system (48% agree, 47% disagree). 
Notably, Americans are less willing to give preference to two groups. More than 6-in-10 
(63%) Americans disagree that preference should be given to immigrants who have a gay 
or lesbian spouse currently living in the U.S. legally. Two-thirds (67%) of Americans also 
disagree that preference should be given to immigrants who are from Western Europe.
Overall, Democrats are more supportive than Republicans of giving preference to 
certain types of immigrants. More than two-thirds (68%) of Democrats and nearly 
6-in-10 (59%) independents agree that immigrants who have children or parents cur-
rently living in the U.S. legally should be given preference by the immigration system, 
compared to less than half (49%) of Republicans. Democrats (67%) are also more 
likely than Republicans (52%) to agree that immigrants who have a degree from an 
American college or university should be given preference, while independents (58%) 
fall in between.
There is a significant generational divide in whether preference should be granted for 
immigrants with gay spouses. Nearly half (46%) of Millennials say that immigrants 
with a gay or lesbian spouse currently living in the U.S. legally should be given prefer-
ence, compared to only 21% of seniors.
Values Guiding Immigration Reform Policy
Just as there is general agreement about immigration policy, especially support for a 
path to citizenship, there is also a broad consensus about a set of values that should 
guide immigration policy. Five values are rated very or extremely important as moral 
guides to immigration reform by approximately 8-in-10 Americans: promoting nation-
al security (84%), keeping families together (84%), protecting the dignity of every per-
son (82%), ensuring fairness to taxpayers (77%), and enforcing the rule of law (77%). 
Nearly 7-in-10 (69%) also say following the Golden Rule—“providing immigrants the 
same opportunity that I would want if my family were immigrating to the U.S.”—is 
a very or extremely important value. Fewer Americans say continuing America’s heri-
tage as a nation of immigrants (52%) or following the biblical example of welcoming 
the stranger (50%) are very or extremely important guides for immigration reform.
Since 2010, levels of support for each of these values have remained relatively steady, 
with one exception.15 The percentage of Americans saying that ensuring fairness to 
taxpayers was an extremely or very important value fell 7 points from 2010 (84%) to 
15 Direct comparisons to 2010 are not possible for two values (promoting national security, ensuring 
the rule of  law) because these values were combined into one item in 2010.
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2013 (77%).16 This decrease was due primarily to a nine-point drop in support for this 
value among Democrats (from 82% in 2010 to 73% in 2013).
Generally speaking, there is much agreement across party lines, with partisan dif-
ferences amounting mostly to contrasting emphases rather than wholesale disagree-
ments. The largest difference between Democrats and Republicans, for example, is 13 
percentage points. 
These differences cluster into two areas: pragmatic-legal vs. cultural-religious values. 
Republicans rank the pragmatic-legal values of promoting national security, enforcing 
the rule of law, and ensuring fairness to taxpayers consistently higher than Democrats 
by double-digit margins. The largest pragmatic-legal values gaps occur on the values 
of promoting national security (Republicans 94%, Democrats 81%) and enforcing the 
rule of law (Republicans 86%, Democrats 73%), where Republicans rate each of these 
16 PRRI, Religion, Values, and Immigration Survey, March 2010 (N=1,201).
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values 13 points higher than Democrats. Democrats, by contrast, rate many of the 
cultural-religious values higher than Republicans. The largest cultural-religious values 
gaps occur on the values of following the Golden Rule (Democrats 75%, Republicans 
62%) and continuing America’s heritage as a nation of immigrants (Democrats 59%, 
Republicans 47%). Democrats rate these values 13 points and 12 points higher respec-
tively than Republicans.  
Religious groups across the spectrum largely agree on a set of values that should 
guide approaches to immigration reform. For instance, white evangelicals are just as 
likely as white mainline Protestants, Catholics, and religiously unaffiliated Americans 
to say protecting the dignity of every person or keeping families together is very or 
extremely important. However, white evangelical Protestants and black Protestants 
are significantly more likely to say that the biblical value of welcoming the stranger is 
an important moral guide (65% each), compared to white mainline Protestants (41%) 
or religiously unaffiliated Americans (31%). Despite the strength of this value among 
white evangelical and black Protestants—groups that share an evangelical theological 
orientation and devotion to the Bible—the biblical value of welcoming the stranger 
still ranks comparatively lower than most other values among these groups. 
The value of continuing America’s heritage as a nation of immigrants has much stron-
ger appeal among Americans with a closer personal connection to the historical centers 
of previous waves of immigration, such as Americans living in the Northeast, older 
Americans, and Catholics. More than 6-in-10 (62%) Americans living in the Northeast, 
including 65% of New Yorkers, say this value is extremely or very important, compared 
to only half (50%) of Americans in the South and Midwest. Seniors are significantly 
more likely than Millennials to say this value is extremely or very important (58% vs. 
45%). There is also a significant religious divide between white Catholics, a group con-
nected with high levels of immigration in the early twentieth century, and white Prot-
estants, groups that typically have much older immigration histories. Nearly 6-in-10 
(57%) white Catholics say that continuing America’s heritage as a nation of immigrants 
is extremely or very important, compared to less than half of white evangelical Protes-
tants (49%) and white mainline Protestants (49%).
These values are correlated with views on immigration policy in different ways. Agree-
ment with three values—continuing our heritage as a nation of immigrants, following 
the Golden Rule, and protecting the dignity of every person—predicts higher support 
for a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. Agreement with two values—ensuring 
fairness to taxpayers and enforcing the rule of law—predicts lower support for a path 
to citizenship.17 For example, there is a 30-point gap in support for a path to citizen-
17 To test the independent relationship of  these values to policy support, we ran a series of  multivari-
ate logistic regression models for each value, using binary support for a path to citizenship for illegal 
immigrants currently living in the U.S. as the dependent variable.  In each model, we included a single 
value along with basic demographic controls.  The logistic regression coefficients for the values that 
had significant results (p<0.05) in each model were as follows: continuing America’s heritage as a na-
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ship for illegal immigrants between those who say two different kinds of “rules” are 
important as moral guides for immigration reform. Among those who say that follow-
ing the Golden Rule is extremely important, 78% say immigrants who are currently 
living in the U.S. illegally should be allowed to become citizens provided they meet 
certain conditions, compared to only 48% of those who say enforcing the rule of law 
is extremely important.
Notably, the values of promoting national security, following the biblical example of 
welcoming the stranger, and keeping families together are not independent predictors 
of support for a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants currently living in the U.S.
The Influence of Knowledge and 
Perceptions of Social Change on Support 
for a Path to Citizenship
In addition to values, knowledge of the numbers of deportations over the past few 
years and perceptions of how American culture and communities are changing are 
strongly correlated with a key part of immigration reform: support for a path to citi-
zenship for illegal immigrants who are already in the U.S.  
Among those who correctly believe that the number of illegal immigrants who have 
been deported back to their home countries has increased over the last five or six years, 
7-in-10 (70%) support a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, 15% say they should 
be given permanent legal status but not citizenship, and 13% say they should be deport-
ed. By contrast, among those who incorrectly believe the number of deportations has 
decreased over this period, less than half (49%) support a path to citizenship, 13% sup-
port permanent legal status but not citizenship, and more than one-third (35%) say ille-
gal immigrants should be deported. However, knowledge about deportations is at least 
partially conditioned by political orientation. Self-identified liberals are significantly 
more likely than conservatives to say deportation has increased (36% vs. 24%), while 
conservatives are twice as likely as liberals to say it has decreased (24% vs. 12%).
Perceptions of whether American culture and way of life has changed for the better 
or the worse since the 1950s also influence support for a path to citizenship for ille-
gal immigrants. Among those who say American culture has changed for the better 
since the 1950s, nearly three-quarters (73%) support a path to citizenship, 14% sup-
port permanent legal status but not citizenship, and 12% say illegal immigrants should 
be deported. Among those who say American culture has changed for the worse, a 
majority (56%) support a path to citizenship, 13% support permanent legal status, and 
nearly 3-in-10 (28%) say they should be deported.
tion of  immigrants (0.597), following the Golden Rule (0.582), protecting the dignity of  every person 
(0.498), ensuring fairness to taxpayers (-0.345), enforcing the rule of  law (-0.459). Other values were 
not significant at p<0.05.
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Among the nearly one-third (32%) of Americans who believe that immigrants today 
are changing their communities a lot, less than half (47%) support a path to citizen-
ship for illegal immigrants, 16% support permanent legal resident status but not citi-
zenship, and more than one-third (34%) say they should be deported.  These views are 
sharply different from Americans who say immigrants are changing their communi-
ties a little. Among this group, nearly two-thirds (64%) support a path to citizenship, 
19% support permanent legal resident status, and 15% say illegal immigrants should 
be deported.
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Perspectives on Survey Findings By E. J. Dionne 
Jr. and William A. Galston
 
There is a surprising level of hope among Democrats and Republicans negotiating 
comprehensive immigration reform legislation. An issue that has been deeply divisive 
and has long resisted a legislative solution finally seems ripe for action. It is widely said 
that Republicans, having seen their presidential share of the Hispanic vote drop to a 
disastrous 27%, are prepared to take steps they were unwilling to consider before the 
2012 election.
But this view has been expressed largely at elite levels of the Republican Party. When 
it comes to legislation, the chances for action seem greater in the Senate than in the 
House of Representatives. A large share of the Republican majority in the House rep-
resents strongly conservative districts where GOP margins are so high that a mem-
ber’s greatest fear is a primary from the right, not a general election challenge. This 
essay examines whether changes in the Republican view extend beyond the party’s 
elite. It also looks at cultural factors affecting views on immigration, in particular the 
attitudes of the white working class, and also whether there is a politics of nostalgia 
that looks back to the 1950s as a particularly blessed time for the nation.
One of the most striking overall findings of the Public Religion Research Institute 
(PRRI) survey is that the opening politicians see on immigration reflects something 
more than opinion at the top of the political system. Rank-and-file Americans also 
seem prepared to support broad immigration reform that includes a path to citizen-
ship. This view is held by a majority of Republicans. One of the survey’s most striking 
findings is that the halfway position of providing illegal immigrants with a path to 
legal status but not citizenship – a position held by many Republican political leaders – 
is the least popular option among rank-and-file Republicans. 
When Republicans are given a choice of legalization with a path to citizenship, legal-
ization in the form of permanent legal resident status without a path to citizenship, 
and deportation, 53% favor a path to citizenship, only 13% favor legalization with-
out citizenship, and 32% favor deportation. Among Democrats, 71% favor a path to 
citizenship, while the legalization-without-citizenship and the deportation options 
Political Change, Cultural 
Change, and Immigration 
Reform’s Opportunity 6
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receive just 13% each. Independents fall slightly closer to the Democrats, with 64% 
supporting a path to citizenship, 14% favoring legalization without citizenship, and 
21% favoring deportation. As is often the case, the views of the country as a whole are 
nearly identical to those of independents.
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There is a consensus for action on immigration, and it crosses partisan lines.
It’s certainly true that there remain strong feelings inside the GOP against illegal immi-
gration. Majorities of Republicans in the Midwest and the South agree that newcomers 
are threatening to the United States, and 65% of both groups agree that we should make 
a serious effort to deport all illegal immigrants back to their home countries. Tea Party 
members are also more skeptical of immigration reform than are other Republicans.
All this points to what may be the largest challenge to immigration reform efforts: 
Republicans face a problem of coalition management that Democrats do not confront. 
Republicans are sharply divided by the issue; Democrats are not.   
Still, even a plurality of Tea Party Republicans favors a path to citizenship. Importantly 
for GOP members of Congress from strongly Republican parts of the country, a major-
ity of Republicans in the red states -- 56% -- favor reform with a path to citizenship.
What explains support among Republicans for immigration reform? This survey is 
not the first to find considerable support for immigration reform that includes a path 
to citizenship. But it does underscore the extent to which Mitt Romney’s poor show-
ing among Hispanic Americans because of his stance on immigration is a political 
fact affecting the views of the Republican rank-and-file as well as the attitudes of the 
party’s political consultant class. Asked if the Republican Party’s stance on immigra-
tion hurt it or helped in recent elections, 39% of Republicans say the party was hurt 
and only 11% say it was helped by its position on immigration. (The rest say it made 
no difference or are unsure.) This view is held by Republicans across regions, though 
it is held slightly more strongly by Republicans in the Northeast and in the West. A 
concern for the party’s long-term well-being may well be driving a shift in Republican 
attitudes on immigration all the way down to its grass roots.
Surveys of opinion are imperfect guides to future legislative maneuvering. But the 
PRRI survey suggests that an immigration bill providing for legalization without a 
path to citizenship may be the least promising option politically. The Republican Par-
ty’s most vociferous opponents of immigration reform are against it altogether and 
prefer a deportation strategy; it is not clear that they would be appeased by a halfway 
solution. And when given a straight binary choice between deportation and a path to 
citizenship, Republicans favor a path to citizenship by a 56% to 41% margin; support 
for citizenship rises to 58% among Republicans in the Northeast and 60% among 
Republicans in the West. At the same time, the legalization-without-citizenship 
approach would not likely help the party to broaden its political appeal. It is rejected 
by both Democrats and independents, and is strongly rejected by Hispanic Americans, 
71% of whom favor a path to citizenship.
Underscoring the fact that Republicans are not as punitive in their approach to illegal 
immigrants as conventional analysis often suggests, the survey finds that Romney’s 
“self-deportation” proposal – making illegal immigrants’ situations so difficult that 
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they would leave the country voluntarily – is actually opposed by most Republicans: 
only 45% support it; 53% oppose it.
Not only do Republicans in Congress appear to have room to support comprehensive 
immigration reform; many in their rank-and-file seem to welcome this possibility. And 
this view extends to white working-class Americans who have grave concerns about 
illegal immigration and worry that immigrants are driving down wages. Nonetheless, 
white working-class Americans also reject a purely punitive approach to the problems 
created by a broken immigration system. 
The White Working Class
Since the end of the 1960s, the shifting sentiments and allegiances of the white work-
ing class have shaped the contours of American politics. Once at the heart of the New 
Deal coalition, the rise of racial politics and the counterculture sent many members of 
this demographic group on a quest for alternatives to post-New Liberalism. Over the 
past three decades, white working-class Americans have supported many Republican 
and conservative candidates, a trend that has intensified in recent years.
The conventional wisdom is that the outlook of the white working class has become 
systematically conservative: hawkish on national defense, traditional on social values, 
skeptical of expanding the scope and cost of the federal government, and eager to 
protect American culture against outside influences, including immigrants. And there 
is evidence in the survey to support these generalizations. Compared to most other 
groups, including whites with at least a four-year college education, white working-
class Americans are less satisfied with the way things are going in the country today, 
less likely to approve of the way President Obama is handling his job, more inclined 
to see the changes since the 1950s as evidence of decline rather than improvement, 
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less supportive of same-sex marriage and legal abortion. On the topic of immigra-
tion, members of the white working class are more likely than other Americans to see 
newcomers as a threat than as source of strength and to believe that the American way 
of life needs to be protected against foreign influences. White working-class Ameri-
cans are also less likely to see immigrants as changing the country for the better, and 
more likely to see them as taking jobs away from other Americans. And they are more 
likely to see the impact of immigrants on both their local communities and American 
society as a bad thing. Fully 71% of white working-class Americans believe that illegal 
immigrants are driving down wages for Americans. And they are less likely than other 
Americans to believe that the pace of deportations has accelerated in recent years, 
even though it has. 
On the policy front, white working-class Americans are slightly more likely than white 
college-educated Americans to see the current immigration system as “completely 
broken” and to support a policy of more secure borders coupled with the identifica-
tion, arrest, and deportation of immigrants now living in the United States illegally. 
They are also more supportive of the strategy known as “self-deportation”: making 
conditions so difficult for illegal immigrants that they return home on their own. Not 
surprisingly, white working-class Americans most trust the Republican Party to do a 
better job of handling illegal immigration, and immigration policy in general.
Despite this evidence, conventional wisdom about the white working class needs to 
be qualified. In the first place, comparisons among groups can obscure the balance 
of sentiments within particular groups. It might come as a surprise to many to learn 
that 52% of white working-class Americans support the DREAM Act, 58% support 
immigration reform that offers a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, and 56% 
support a comprehensive solution—border security plus an earned path to citizen-
ship—rather than a strategy of only border security and deportation. Although 43% 
of white working-class Americans support a self-deportation strategy (compared to 
only 24% of college-educated whites), 55% reject it. In sum, while the white working 
class is generally more hostile to immigrants and more ambivalent about immigra-
tion policy than are other Americans, in the end most members of this group shrink 
from purely punitive policies and support a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants 
already living in the country.
The second caveat is that the white working class is less homogeneous than commonly 
believed. Age and to a lesser extent region make a difference. Compared with older 
cohorts, young adults in the white working class are significantly less likely to see 
immigrants as threats, more likely to think they are changing their local community 
and the country for the better, and less likely to see them as taking away jobs from 
Americans. A majority of white working-class Millennials reject the proposition that 
the American way of life needs protection against foreign influences, while majorities 
of white working-class Americans age 30 and older endorse it.  
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To some extent, these differences reflect what sociologists call the “contact hypoth-
esis”—the proposition that as members of a group become more familiar with out-
siders, their fear and antipathy to them will tend to diminish. White working-class 
Millennials (age 18-29) are more likely than older cohorts to live in communities with 
substantial numbers of new immigrants, and also to have close friends who were born 
outside the United States. Fully 60% of white working-class Millennials report that 
they have close friends who were born outside the U.S., compared to only 41% of 
white working-class seniors (age 65 and older).
In addition, young white working-class Americans have backgrounds that distinguish 
them from older cohorts. Fifty-four percent of white working-class Millennials have 
not only completed high school but have gained some college education as well, com-
pared to only 30% of white working-class seniors. Only 22% of white working-class 
Millennials identify themselves as evangelical Protestants, compared to 32% of white 
working-class Americans as a whole and 42% of white working-class seniors. Only 
27% of white working-class Millennials report attending church once a week or more, 
compared to 47% of white working-class seniors. A stunning 38% of white working-
class Millennials report that they are religiously unaffiliated, compared to only 9% of 
white working-class seniors.
Given these differences, it makes sense that white working-class Millennials are very 
different from their parents and grandparents in their ideological orientation. Specifi-
cally, they are far less likely to identify themselves as conservative, and far more likely 
to call themselves liberal. The ideological breakdown of Americans as a whole is 37% 
conservative, 34% moderate, and 24% liberal. The white working class as a whole is 
more conservative than are other Americans: 44% conservative, 33% moderate, and 
only 19% liberal. But consider the breakdown within the white working class:
In short, white working-class Millennials are ideologically indistinguishable from the 
population as a whole; not so for older cohorts in this group. This correlates with 
attitudes on a range of social issues. White working-class Millennials support same-
sex marriage by a margin of 74 to 22%; tougher environmental regulation by 63 to 
35%; and the Dream Act, 64 to 33%. Compared to older cohorts, they are much more 
likely to believe that Hispanics, Muslims, gays and lesbians, and non-religious people 
have made the country better. They draw the line at atheists, but so do Americans as 
a whole, by a margin of four to one. Indeed, only 27% of white working-class Millen-
nials believe that atheists are making the country worse, compared to 65% of white 
working-class seniors and 39% of Americans as a whole.
Finally, there is evidence of regional differences. Compared with other white working-
class Americans, those who hail from the South are more likely to view immigrants as 
a threat and to believe they are changing the country for the worse. Fifty-two percent 
of white working-class Americans who live in the South believe that immigrants are 
changing American society “a lot,” and by a margin of 63% to 27%, they think that 
this change is a bad thing. They are more likely to believe that immigrants are tak-
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ing jobs away from Americans and that illegal immigrants are driving down wages. 
And they are significantly more likely to believe that the American way of life needs 
to be protected against foreign influences. Roughly half (49%) of white working-class 
Southerners support the “self-deportation” strategy.
Compared to other members of the white working class, Southerners are more likely 
to believe that groups such as Muslims, Hispanics, gays and lesbians, and especially 
atheists are changing the country for the worse. Their opposition to same-sex mar-
riage is intense: while 60% of white working-class Americans from the Northeast, 
56% of white working-class Americans from the West, and 49% of white working-
class Americans from the Midwest supporting extending the right to marry to gays 
and lesbians, only 38% of white working-class Southerners agree. A majority of white 
working-class Southerners (55%) oppose this step.
More broadly, 35% of white working-class Southerners identify as Republicans, versus 
30% for the white working class as a whole. Nearly half (47%) of white working-class 
Southerners are evangelical Protestants, versus 32% for the white working class as a 
whole. More than 4-in-10 (43%) white working-class Southerners attend religious ser-
vices once a week or more, versus 35% for the white working class as a whole.
We have elaborated these age and regional differences to make one simple point: the 
prevailing conception of the white working class has been shaped by those who are 
often the most vocal members of the group, and they are often older and hail from the 
South. As the youngest members of this group reach maturity and its older members 
pass on, the balance of attitudes within this group will gradually shift toward those of 
the country as a whole. This shift could be especially pronounced in the South, which 
has a larger share of the working class over the age of 65 than any other region. While 
white working-class Americans from the South may retain some of their distinctive 
characteristics and attitudes, they are likely over time to play a less pivotal role in shap-
ing American politics and society than they have in recent decades, a shift that could 
change the balance of power within the Republican Party and open up new possibili-
ties for its aspiring younger leaders. This generational shift will have a powerful long-
term effect on the politics of nostalgia.    
The Demographics of Nostalgia
President Obama’s second inaugural address was a narrative of moral progress won 
through social struggle. The memorable alliteration of Seneca Falls, Selma, and Stone-
wall captured the core idea: America is about the aspiration for equality, and equality 
comes through full inclusion in every aspect of American life. President Obama laid 
out a clear vision: while we still have a long way to go, we are a better and more inclu-
sive society than we were before African-Americans, women, gays and lesbians, the 
disabled, and most recently Hispanic Americans, won fuller rights protected by law.
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Remarkably, the survey suggests that many Americans harbor reservations about the 
president’s assessment. We asked whether America’s culture and way of life has mostly 
changed for the better or mostly for the worse since the 1950s. Only 40% believe that 
the changes were positive; fully 54% believe the opposite.
It is not entirely unexpected that 53% of men would feel this way. Many men have 
fared poorly in recent decades, especially on the economic front. For all but the highest 
cohorts of income and education, male wages have stagnated or fallen, and many unem-
ployed men have had to accept new jobs that offered lower pay and reduced benefits.
It is surprising, however, that a comparable share of women (55%) offer a negative 
assessment of changes since the 1950s. The standard narrative, backed by considerable 
evidence, is that women have made gains on virtually every front, economic, social, 
and political. The popular TV series “Mad Men” offers a glimpse of the way things 
used to be, and it is hard to believe that many women would welcome a return to the 
status quo ante. But powerful considerations, related to other social changes and shifts 
in moral attitudes since the 1950s, keep them from fully embracing the saga of prog-
ress. We need to understand better what they are.
When we turn to age cohorts, a similar pattern emerges. Only 41% of Americans ages 
30 to 49 think we are better off, a figure that falls to 37% for those ages 50 to 64 and 
to a meager 29% for Americans 65 and older. To be sure, a bare majority (51%) of Mil-
lennials think the changes are for the better. But a surprising 42% take the opposite 
view. Among white working-class Millennials, fully 57% think the changes of the past 
half century have been for the worse. 
Much the same is true for education. Only 37% of Americans with a high school edu-
cation or less think that change since the 1950s has been for the better, a figure that 
barely budges when those with some college are added in. While 47% of those with 
a four-year college degree take an affirmative view of these changes, 48% do not. 
Only among those with advanced post-graduate education do we find a narrow major-
ity—51%—who think we are better off than we were fifty years ago, and even in this 
privileged group, 42% disagree.
Among Americans who identify with a religion, disapproval of these changes is wide-
spread, again suggesting that approval of a moral code presumed to be stricter is part 
of the appeal of the 1950s. Only 21% of white evangelical Protestants think we are bet-
ter off than in the 1950s; no surprise there. But the view is not much more sanguine 
among white mainline Protestants (34%), Mormons (38%), and Hispanic Protestants 
(39%). Overall, only 43% of Catholics think we have moved in the right direction; 
52% disagree. Jews are outliers: fully 65% think the changes have been for the better.
One might have expected that religious African-Americans would be at least as enthu-
siastic as Jews. No other group has experienced such dramatic strides toward fuller 
inclusion in American life. They have gained the right to vote and exercise that right 
as vigorously as do other Americans, and often more so. Many of the barriers between 
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white and black culture have been erased. African-Americans are now represented—
not proportionately, to be sure—in the upper echelons of American life. The first 
African-American president was not only elected but reelected. And yet 38% of black 
Protestants think the changes of the past half-century have been for the worse.  
This is more than a reflection of socially conservative religious sentiment. When we 
look at race and ethnicity, we find 39% of all African-Americans expressing a negative 
view of the changes since the 1950s—a smaller share than Hispanic (43%) and white 
(61%) Americans, but still surprisingly high. We may speculate that changes in family 
structure and the texture of life in urban communities are contributing to these views. 
As with women, researchers need to dig deeper to understand what is going on.
In this period of intense polarization, it is not surprising to find that assessments of 
where we stand today relative to the 1950s break down along lines of partisanship and 
ideology. Only 23% of Republicans and 39% of independents think that America’s 
culture and way of life is better than it was fifty years ago. By contrast, 55% of Demo-
crats have a positive view of these developments. Similarly, only 27% of conservatives 
and 43% of moderates think that these changes have been for the better, compared to 
59% of liberals.
It is certainly no accident that the core of the coalition that elected and reelected Barack 
Obama—African Americans, Latinos, Asians, Democrats, liberals, young adults, and 
older adults with advanced educational and professional training—are the demo-
graphic groups with a positive view of social change during the past half-century. It 
was those groups for whom the president spoke in his second inaugural address. But 
many of the Americans whose support put him over the top are far more ambivalent. 
His share of the vote among women, moderates, Catholics, even African Americans 
and young adults, substantially exceeded the share of those groups who look favor-
ably on the past half-century. Even among those who approve of his job performance 
today, there are doubts: although 58% say the changes since the 1950s have been for 
the better, 36% say they have been for the worse. We suspect that this ambivalence 
will persist—and that it will help shape the context of our social and political lives for 
years to come.
Conclusion: The Prospects for Immigration Reform
As we noted at the outset, public opinion does not always sway the legislative process, 
especially since the views held by the nation as a whole are often at odds with the 
views that prevail in particular states and particular Congressional districts. Senators 
and members of Congress who have won election (and, in most cases, re-election) have 
a justifiable confidence in their ability to read the views of their own constituents and 
to gauge the political benefits and risks of particular votes. And the fear of opening 
themselves to primary challenges dominated by voters with intensely held views can 
yield calculations that cut against majority sentiments, even within their own parties. 
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Nonetheless, the details of the survey suggest that many Republicans, who will be key 
to the passage of any comprehensive immigration reform, may be overestimating the 
degree of opposition to immigration reform, even in red states and districts. 
The survey found surprising support for comprehensive immigration reform even in 
the most loyal Republican base constituencies. Among white evangelical Protestant 
Republicans who do not consider themselves part of the Tea Party, 57% favor a path 
to citizenship; among Tea Party members who are not evangelical, 46% favor a path 
to citizenship. Support is weakest among Republicans who are both white evangeli-
cal Protestants and Tea Party members, but even 44% of this group favors a path to 
citizenship. These “Teavangelicals” are among the most vocal and ardent supporters 
of the GOP, but they constitute only about 10% of the Republican rank-and-file. By 
contrast, Republicans who are neither evangelical nor Tea Party members constitute 
nearly half of those who consider themselves Republicans, and 54% of this group 
favor a path to citizenship.
It is often said Americans who live in areas of high recent immigration are especially 
hostile to immigration reform. But the survey found that support for a path to citizen-
ship was actually weakest among respondents who said they live in areas where there 
are “almost no new immigrants.” Even in this group, 58% favor a path to citizenship.
Immigration remains a volatile issue. Many Americans remain conflicted in their atti-
tudes toward immigrants themselves and toward immigration more generally. But 
majority sentiment, including sentiment among Republicans, favors action. Support-
ers of a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants are unlikely to find a moment more 
favorable to the case they have to make.
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Appendix 1: Survey Methodology
Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey 2013
The survey was designed and conducted by Public Religion Research Institute in part-
nership with the Brookings Institution. The survey was made possible by a generous 
grant from The Ford Foundation, with additional support from The Nathan Cum-
mings Foundation and Four Freedoms Fund/Public Interest Projects. Results of the 
survey were based on bilingual (Spanish and English) telephone interviews conducted 
between January 28, 2013 and February 24, 2013, by professional interviewers under 
the supervision of Directions in Research. Interviews were conducted by telephone 
among a random sample of 4,465 adults 18 years of age or older in the entireUnited 
States (1,774 respondents were interviewed on a cell phone). The landline and cell 
phone samples were provided by Survey Sampling International and the final sample 
was weighted to ensure proper representativeness.
The weighting was accomplished in two stages. The first stage of weighting cor-
rected for different probabilities of selection associated with the number of adults in 
each household and each respondent’s telephone usage patterns. In the second stage, 
sample demographics were balanced by form to match target population parameters 
for gender, age, education, race and Hispanic ethnicity, region (U.S. Census defini-
tions), population density and telephone usage. The population density parameter was 
derived from Census 2010 data. The telephone usage parameter came from an analy-
sis of the January- June 2012 National Health Interview Survey. All other weighting 
parameters were derived from an analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 American 
Community Survey.
The sample weighting was accomplished using Sample Balancing, a special iterative 
sample- weighting program that simultaneously balances the distributions of all vari-
ables. Weights were trimmed to prevent individual interviews from having too much 
influence on the final results. The use of these weights in statistical analysis ensures 
that the demographic characteristics of the sample closely approximate the demo-
graphic characteristics of the target populations.
The margin of error is +/- 1.7 percentage points for the general sample at the 95% 
confidence level. In addition to sampling error, surveys may also be subject to error or 
bias due to question wording, context, and order effects.
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PRRI Religion and Politics Tracking Poll, March 2013
This report contains the results of a List Experiment which was conducted on the PRRI 
Religion and Politics Tracking Poll. The methodology for this survey is as follows.
The survey was designed and conducted by Public Religion Research Institute. Results 
of the survey were based on bilingual (Spanish and English) RDD telephone inter-
views conducted between March 6, 2013 and March 10, 2013 by professional inter-
viewers under the direction of Social Science Research Solutions (SSRS). Interviews 
were conducted among a random sample of 1,028 adults 18 years of age or older in the 
continental United States (415 respondents were interviewed on a cell phone).
The final sample was weighted to five different parameters—age, sex, geographic 
region, education and telephone usage—to ensure reliable and accurate representation 
of the total adult population.
The margin of error for the survey is +/- 3.1 percentage points at the 95% level of con-
fidence. In addition to sampling error, surveys may also be subject to error or bias due 
to question wording, context and order effects.
Group N
White, non-Hispanic 3,244
Black, non-Hispanic 382
Hispanic 450
Asian 94
Conservative 1,766
Liberal 997
Moderate 1,521
Republican 1,157
Democrat 1,377
Independent 1,678
Tea Party 446
Group N
All Americans 4,465
White evangelical Protestant 947
White mainline Protestant 778
Black Protestant 282
Hispanic Protestant 138
Catholic 938
White Catholic 647
Hispanic Catholic 211
Jewish 108
Mormon 97
Religiously Unaffiliated 805
Sample Sizes for Selected Groups
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Appendix 2: Comparisons to Previous Surveys, 
Selected Questions
2011 2013
The best way to solve the country’s illegal immigration problem is to 
secure our borders and arrest and deport all those who are here illegally
36 29
The best way to solve the country’s illegal immigration problem is 
to both secure our borders and provide an earned path to citizen-
ship for illegal immigrants already in the U.S.
62 68
Neither/Both equally (VOL.) 1 2
Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 1 1
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, 
September 2011 (N=2,450)
We should make a serious effort to deport all illegal immigrants back to 
their home countries.
2011 2013
Completely agree 22 19
Mostly agree 29 24
Mostly disagree 31 30
Completely disagree 17 25
Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 2 2
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, 
September 2011 (N=2,450)
Allowing illegal immigrants brought to the U.S. as children to gain legal 
resident status if they join the military or go to college?
2011 2013
Strongly favor 18 21
Favor 39 40
Oppose 24 21
Strongly Oppose 16 13
Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 3 4
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, 
September 2011 (N=2,450)  
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How often, if at all, does your clergy leader speak out about the issue of 
immigration? *
2010 2013
Often 6 6
Sometimes 18 16
Rarely 32 27
Never 43 49
Don’t know/Refused (VOL.) 1 1
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, 
March 2010 (N=1,201)
Do you live in a community with many new immigrants, some new im-
migrants, only  a few new immigrants, or almost no new immigrants? 
2005 2013
Many new immigrants 25 24
Some new immigrants 25 23
Only a few new immigrants 21 23
Almost no new immigrants 25 27
Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 4 3
Source: NBC News/Wall Street Journal, December 2005 (N=1,006)
How much, if at all, do you think immigrants today are changing your 
COMMUNITY and way of life? 
2011 2013
A lot 38 32
A little 47 46
Not at all 14 21
Don't know (VOL.) 1 1
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, 
September 2011 (N=2,450)
*Note: Asked of those who attend religious services at least once or twice a month.
Do you think the current immigration system in the United States is... 2010 2013
Generally working 7 7
Working but with some major problems 34 29
Broken but working in some areas 35 40
Completely broken 21 23
Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 3 2
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Religion, Values, and Immigration Reform Survey, 
March 2010 (N=1,201)
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How much, if at all, do you think immigrants today are changing 
AMERICAN SOCIETY and way of life?
2011 2013
A lot 53 46
A little 39 45
Not at all 8 8
Don't know (VOL.) 1 1
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, 
September 2011 (N=2,450)  
2011 2013
The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens 
traditional American customs and values.
42 40
The growing number of newcomers from other countries strength-
ens American society.
53 54
Neither/Both equally (VOL.) 2 3
Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 3 3
Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Pluralism, Immigration, and Civic Integration Survey, 
September 2011 (N=2,450)
Immigrants today think of themselves as Americans just as much as im-
migrants from earlier eras did.
2004 2013
Completely agree/Strongly agree 30 19
Mostly agree/Somewhat agree 37 40
Mostly disagree/Somewhat disagree 18 23
Completely disagree/Strongly disagree 9 13
Don't know/Refused (VOL.) 7 5
Source: 21st Century Americanism: Nationally Representative Survey of the United States Popula-
tion,  December 2004 (N=2,800)
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Public Religion Research Institute
Public Religion Research Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated 
to research at the intersection of religion, values, and public life. Our mission is to help 
journalists, opinion leaders, scholars, clergy, and the general public better understand 
debates on public policy issues and the role of religion in American public life by con-
ducting high quality public opinion surveys and qualitative research.
For a full list of recent projects, see our research page: 
http://www.publicreligion.org/research/
PRRI also maintains a lively online presence on Facebook and Twitter: 
http://www.facebook.com/publicreligion 
http://www.twitter.com/publicreligion
Brookings
The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washing-
ton, D.C. Our mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on 
that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations that advance three 
broad goals: Strengthen American democracy; Foster the economic and social wel-
fare, security and op portunity of all Americans; and Secure a more open, safe, pros-
perous and cooperative international system. Brookings is proud to be consistently 
ranked as the most influential, most quoted, and most trusted think tank.
Governance Studies at Brookings
Dating back to Brookings’ founding in 1916, the Governance Studies Program at 
Brookings is one of the world’s most recognized and respected research programs 
focused on governance challenges in the U.S. and around the world, major policy 
issues, and political institutions. In addition, our scholarship evaluates trends in public 
opinion and political pro cess, and offers ideas on institutional reform to ensure better 
governance.
Viewed as a premier, independent voice in the domestic policymaking sphere, Gov-
ernance Studies is home to two re search centers: The Brown Center on Education 
Policy and The Center for Technology Innovation.
The program’s key objectives include: Provide policymakers with expert analysis, 
cutting-edge research and policy ideas to ensure better institutional governance; 
Improve the performance of the national government to benefit all people; Inform 
policy debates and impact legislation and executive actions.
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Robert P. Jones, CEO
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religion, values, and public life. He is the author of two academic books and numerous 
peer-review articles on religion and public policy.
Dr. Jones writes a weekly “Figuring Faith” column at the Washington Post’s On Faith 
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